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ART. VII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Chips from a German Workshop*. By MAX MÜLLER, M. A., etc. Vol. I. *Essays on the Science of Religion*. Vol. II. *Essays on Mythology, Traditions, and Customs*. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. xxxv., 374, and 402.

OUR notice of this important work, which was published in England not less than two years ago, comes a little late. But we were willing to await the time when the appearance of the American (authorized) reprint should have put it in the hands or within the reach of more of our readers. Everybody now knows it, at least by repute, as one of the striking books of the decade; as excelled in interest by none of Professor Müller's former publications, great as has been the acceptance which these have won. Their author has so gained the ear of the reading public, that anything which he may send out is sure of a wide circulation and the most favorable consideration. We rejoice that the present volumes come forth with this prestige, for they are worthy to be extensively studied, and cannot fail to exert a valuable influence in moulding the views of thoughtful men. They are in advance of the general opinion, but in the direction in which that opinion seems to be moving. The mode of their usefulness is twofold: as they furnish authentic information respecting the religious ideas and mythical fancies of periods and races lying outside our European Christian civilization; and as they instigate us to view these in their right relation to one another and to Christianity. No one living, probably, is better qualified than Professor Müller for the task which he has here undertaken. His specialty, the study of the Veda, sets him in the very heart of the myths and creeds and rites of the Indo-European peoples, and hardly any one has studied them more deeply, or in a more original spirit, than he. The circle of Vedic divinities and their Greek correspondents are his most engrossing theme; but he is hardly less full upon the subject of the Zend-Avesta; while the monotheism of the Semites, the dry utilitarian precepts of Confucius, the dizzying doctrines of Buddhism, and the simple beliefs of half-civilized American aborigines, receive also not a little of his attention. Such trustworthy and comprehensive information, so attractively presented within so brief compass, is not elsewhere to be found by the student of the general religious history of mankind. Made up, as it is, of independent essays, collected and reprinted with little change, the work has not the order and completeness of a systematic treatise; but it is more easily read than such a treatise would be;

each essay is a whole in itself, and not long enough to fatigue the attention of any one who is capable of deriving profit from the instruction it offers. There is also, it must be confessed, some repetition, which we might wish that the author had been willing, by a little additional labor in rewriting, to avoid; yet the fault is one of trivial consequence in comparison with the solid merits of the work. So large, and so much the most important, part of the two volumes deals with religions, that the work as a whole is fairly to be reckoned as religious, although only the first volume purports by its title to be such. The title, by the way, is not quite happily chosen: the preface alone is of the nature of an "essay on the science of religion"; the rest are rather essays on specific religions, as contributions to a science of religion. This science the author would fain see constructed after the model of the science of language, and founded upon a comparative study of all the religions which prevail or have prevailed upon the earth, and upon an understanding of them as the diverse products and expressions of one universal religious faculty or instinct. He pleads with much fervor and eloquence for the free and impartial submission of all religions, Christianity included, to this scientific investigation, this historical and comparative examination; urging in its favor the authority of the old Christian fathers, and the advantage certain to accrue to us in the better comprehension and estimation of our own religion, not less than of those with which it is compared. He earnestly protests, at the same time, against the prevailing judgment of heathen religions as products of human depravity, sacrilegious devil-worships, worthy of unmixed condemnation; and insists upon their claim to be regarded as earnest, though erring, attempts on the part of short-sighted humanity to solve the same great problems to which our own faith is an answer. Professor Müller fully recognizes the difficulty of persuading the great body of those who hold the Christian religion to let it become the object of a scientific scrutiny, along with the rest, as if it were of like substance with them. Their feelings are almost invincibly opposed to such treatment. This is no product of the religious instinct, but a body of absolute truth, supernaturally revealed, and obtainable in no other way. Nor are Christians alone likely to be found impracticable. The sincere advocates of every creed under heaven will insist on making a similar reservation. You may analyze and compare other religions as you will, tracing their various features to certain traits of human nature, or influences of human history and institutions; but each one's own faith is something of a different class. The Moslem has authority for all that he believes, in the infallible inspiration of his prophet; the Brahman claims that his Veda has existed from all eternity, and is itself a foundation of truth,

undemonstrable and unassailable; the Buddhist vaunts the superhuman wisdom and power of the dreamy ascetic who taught him to aspire to extinction, — and so with the rest. Only the Chinese, who have never arrogated to their great teacher anything but superior insight and purity of heart, will be liberal enough to join heartily with the votaries of the new science, along with those who elsewhere may have risen, or fallen, into a Chinese indifferentism. It is in vain to tell each one that, if his creed really contains the essence of divine wisdom, the most searching and impartial study and comparison will only bring its superiority more clearly to light: he will see an indignity in the very quest.

But even those who accept the impartial comparison of all religions have room to doubt the feasibility of a science of religion. Religion is so intricately intertwined with the whole of human thought and action that it hardly admits of being separated and considered apart, completely and distinctly. Its substance, — human opinions and convictions, — is of too subjective a character to be easily and safely handled; and the creeds which strive to express it, the rites and observances which it prompts, are wont to be, as our author well shows, untrustworthy witnesses to its true character. They are very unlike the words and forms and phrases of which human speech consists: these have enough of the concrete and objective about them to bear scientific treatment. A science of religion seems almost as little to be looked for as a science of human opinion, or of manners and customs.

These, it may be alleged, are merely difficulties in the way, and the progress of study and of the enlightenment of general opinion will show them not to be insuperable. But we do not see even the possibility of a science of religion upon just the basis which Müller would establish for it. If the bulk of human religions have their origin in the universal facts of human nature and the variety of human character and circumstances, then something like a scientific exposition of their rise and development may be possible; not otherwise. According to what may be called the naturalistic view, now accepted by many of the students of human history, the religious feeling is called forth in the first instance, and guided in its growth, by men's recognition of a power without them and infinitely superior to them, manifested in the phenomena of the world which surrounds them; by their irresistible disposition to attribute to this power an anthropomorphous form or forms, paralleling its action with that which they best understand and see to be most efficient within the sphere of their own consciousness and observation; and by the attempt to settle their own relation to it, and put themselves in communication with it, in order to the obtaining of good and the averting of evil. Man is the only creature capable of forming the fundamental conception

of something in nature higher and greater than himself, and of feeling the desire to penetrate its secrets ; but he acquires this capacity along with his rise above his primitive and natural condition, his utterly savage state. There are races, even now, so sunken and absorbed in the lowest wants of their animal nature, that no religious idea has ever dawned upon their minds, any more than the idea of beauty, or the love of virtue. In different races such ideas make their appearance at different epochs of mental progress, and assume a very diverse form, with corresponding influence upon life and character. With some, religion is from the outset an ennobling element ; it elevates and makes them happy ; with others, it begins and remains abject and cringing ; it is full of dread, like the fear of children in the dark ; it expresses itself in deprecatory rites, and is fertile of superstitions of every kind. On the whole, it follows a certain direction of advance ; it makes its way from blinder and more childish views to such as are clearer and stronger ; it begins with finding gods and demons everywhere, in its naïve ascription of each class of phenomena to a separate agency ; it tends, where character and circumstances favor, toward an apprehension of a unity in all the varying phenomena of the universe, and a oneness of their creator and manager, — that is to say, it tends from polytheism toward monotheism.

Now it appears to us that no one who does not take something like the view thus set forth of the rise and growth of the heathen religions has any right to talk of a science of religion at all ; and it is at this fundamental point that we deem Professor Müller's science wanting in soundness and consistency. His religious philosophy presents a curious analogy with his linguistic philosophy. In language, he adopts and teaches the current methods of historical research, treating human speech as the product of a continuous process of development from elements the most simple and formless, carried on along with its use by men who have spoken it, until he gets back to the very beginning : there he assumes a miracle, not precisely a scriptural, but a kind of natural or materialistic miracle ; namely, an original instinct, different from anything which men have nowadays, vouchsafed for the express purpose of setting in motion the process of linguistic development, and withdrawn when it had answered that purpose. So also, at the very fountain-head of all religion he finds — we must not say an instinct, since he criticises and rejects that word as used by Renan, but what is equivalent — an intuition and a feeling, “an intuition of God and the immediate feeling of dependence on God,” which “could only have been the result of a primitive revelation.” This intuition he regards as neither monotheistic nor polytheistic ; and its natural expression is

simply the dogma, "God is God." Elsewhere he calls it a "feeling of sonship," and qualifies it as *henotheistic*, that is to say, as not apprehending or believing in more gods than one, although at the same time not consciously holding the unity of God.

So far as this is intelligible to us, it is altogether unsatisfactory. If Müller means simply to maintain that before the distinct and conscious recognition of a plurality of gods there must have existed in the minds of untutored men a dim and undefined apprehension of an extra-human force or forces at work in the world about them, he is only presenting in a somewhat peculiar form the prevailing view stated above. But his phraseology does not fairly imply this; it seems hardly accordant with any other theory than that of an original paradisiac condition of man, as a being with powers miraculously developed and knowledge stored up by superhuman means, instead of such a one as any of us might have been if flung at birth into a desert land and nurtured by wild beasts. We do not suppose that our author holds such a theory, although he nowhere that we have noticed expresses himself distinctly either for or against it. Doubtless he believes in a general upward progress of mankind since the earliest ages, in the gradual development of powers at first possessed unconsciously, in the accumulation of knowledge and the acquisition of the power to use it and reason upon it. That the untaught and undeveloped generations of men were capable of an intuition of God and a feeling of sonship, seems to us quite inconceivable: we fail to see upon what good ground the assumption can be maintained as plausible. So far as Müller himself attempts to support it by argument and illustration, he is not very successful. Thus, to prove the priority of monotheism, he alleges the fact that "in no language does the plural exist before the singular." But the same fact, it is evident, would equally prove that the existence of one sole tree or bird was believed in before that of many trees or birds; that men were monodruists and monornithists before they became polydruists and polyornithists. If we do not misunderstand him, he would account for the separation of one God into many gods in such ways as this: Men first said *tonat*, *βροντᾷ*, meaning "he thunders," that is to say, he, the one God. Then, since the thunder came from the sky, they occasionally said also "the sky thunders"; and this mode of speech grew into a habit, so that finally "he" and "the sky" became irretrievably mixed together in their minds, "by the almost irresistible force of language," and they confusedly looked upon the latter as one of the names of the former. And, having committed similar confusions in speaking of other manifestations of the one supreme deity, they found themselves all at once in possession of a set of names for him,

as sky (*Jupiter, Zeus*) and so on, which they imagined to be names of so many distinct beings. And so they fell into polytheism.

We should be very glad to make an exposition of this peculiar theory which should be less implausible and even self-refuting, but we know not how to do so. It attributes to words a kind of power over the mind which we can only compare to jugglery, and which we cannot but regard as inconsistent with any sound view of human speech. It is not, however, altogether at variance with opinions respecting language which our author has elsewhere expressed. He inclines generally to regard words as the masters rather than the servants of ideas, holding that the former condition the latter, instead of being produced for their service, and that no abstract conception is for a moment possible without a vocable expressing it. Thus, also, in the essay on "Semitic Monotheism," from which we have taken a part of the expressions quoted or referred to above, he combats with much vigor Renan's theory of an original monotheistic tendency in the character of the Semitic races (Hebrews, Arabs, etc.), and ascribes whatever may be peculiar to them in this regard to the peculiarity of their language, the radical meaning in their words being much more persistent than in those of other tongues, — a Semitic epithet remaining an epithet merely, while in Indo-European languages, for example, its origin is readily forgotten, and it assumes the value of a specific designation. The Semite could never be cheated into imagining that, in the phrase *Zeus ὁ σπovτῆρ*, *Zeus* signified a being instead of a part of the material creation, because its appellative meaning, "the bright," or "shining," would not be wholly lost from memory. This characteristic feature of Semitic speech is very suitably brought in as an element in the discussion; but most scholars, we are persuaded, will think that Müller overestimates its importance, and that his solution of the problem is, to say the least, not more satisfactory than that of the author he opposes. The Semites have managed to find real names for all the objects they have wished to designate; and if their mythopœic or theopœic tendency had been as pronounced as that of the leading Indo-European races, we see no reason to believe that they would not have fabricated as many myths, and believed in as many gods. In fact, as our author points out, if all the Semitic races are taken into view, it is found that they have been polytheistic enough; and he ascribes their exalted doctrine of one God directly to the one man Abraham, whom he believes to have received it by divine revelation. So that, after all, it appears that the original intuition of one God, even when aided by the unyielding processes of Semitic word-formation, has not been able to furnish the later world with a single monotheistic religion. It is not without show of reason

that Müller rejects Renan's theory of a Semitic "instinct" for monotheism, as refuted by the general Semitic worship of Baal, Moloch, Ashtaroth, and the rest; but what shall we think of his own universal "intuition" of humanity, which in every race under heaven has been blinded and baffled by its own blundering attempt at expression, and whose appointed office has had to be filled by a later superhuman agency?

The vexed question of Semitic monotheism is much too recondite to be followed out here; we can only touch upon it in passing; and would say to our readers that two more eloquent and interesting articles than those of Renan and Müller upon it are not easily to be found in the whole range of discussion upon this class of subjects.

There is yet another point, closely connected with those already treated, in regard to which our author appears to us not less guilty of exaggerating the influence of expression; and it is a point of prime consequence. Mythology, not less than polytheism, is laid by him at the door of language. His views as to the relation of myths and words are drawn out more fully in the second series of his *Lectures on Language* than in the present work; yet the second volume of *Chips* contains his celebrated Oxford Essay on Comparative Mythology, which sketched the outline of his whole system, and even brought forward many of the details which have attracted the attention of scholars, and led to no small comment and controversy. He goes so far as to declare mythology a kind of "disease of language," and to maintain that men were led along into mythic fancies, as into a belief in many gods, without their own knowledge and almost against their own will, by the overpowering influence of the phrases they used. It may be that his expressions do him partial injustice, and that his views are not so different from those of other scholars as they appear to be; but we are persuaded that he at any rate presents the subject in a false light, and lays an unsound and untenable foundation for the whole study of myths. We at the present day say, "The wind dashes the rain against the house," "The cloud darts lightnings at the earth," and so on, in what we call figurative or poetic phrase, without running the least risk of sliding away into a belief that the wind and cloud are superhuman beings, acting after the manner of men. Why is this? Because, says Professor Müller, words have less power over us than over the ancient generations; because our thought is withered; because our language is not suffering under that specific disease; and more of the same sort. But in this he is himself a mythopœist. One of the essential parts of myth-making is the substitution of an analogy for an explanation. To express by a figure something which is only half-understood or wholly

obscure, then to dwell upon the figurative expression as if it were a true definition, and let it hide from sight the thing meant to be expressed, is a good process in mythology, though not in science. What is the power of a word? A word is nothing but the sign of a conception: the only force in action is the wind which forms the conception, and the word is used as its sign. We are saved from making gods of the wind and cloud by the fact that we have long since left behind us that stage of development in which we inclined to see in the works of nature the acts, and effects of acts, of beings similar to men. This inclination, now, seems to us to be incontestably the true mythopœic force, and it should receive the first place and consideration in all theoretic discussion of mythologic fancies. The linguist may then go on to show how designation by a word is an important step in the process of personification, how it constitutes an external support for the conceptions to cling to, and furnishes the means whereby the figurative statement is handed down more faithfully than its explanation; so that the two are finally divorced from one another, and there remains a myth, with its proper meaning unintelligible to those who report and credit it. Thus the study of language is proved to have a most important bearing upon that of mythology, although not, as our author is inclined to claim, its actual foundation.

As regards the details of his mythological investigations, it is well known that Müller is at variance with many of the best specialists in this department on the continent, who regard a part of his comparisons and explanations as fanciful and erroneous, and his etymologies as forced. Especially, they refuse to follow him in his identification of almost all mythic figures with the sun or the dawn, and his explanation of numberless myths as growing out of the relation of those two manifestations. Whether, however, he be finally proved wrong or right, it is certain that he has struck a very productive vein and worked it in a most ingenious manner, and that the views he has suggested and the discussions he has stirred up cannot fail to promote the rapid advancement of the study of primitive religions.

The manner and style of these essays of Müller, as of his larger and more serious works heretofore published, are worthy of high praise. No English author in this department has a greater power as a writer of English than he; none writes with more fervid thought or more genuinely eloquent expression. Of course, the essays are not of entirely equal merit in these respects; and it should be especially noted that one who commences his perusal of the work with the first essay in the first volume, the author's lecture at Leeds on the Veda, will gain a too unfavorable idea of the whole, of which it is the heaviest and least at-

tractive portion, though replete with valuable information. The same paper exhibits, to our apprehension, a rather marked tendency to put its author forward as the editor of *the Veda*, instead of *an* editor of *a Veda*. The same tendency appears here and there in other essays. That the Rig-Veda is by far the most important work of its class, no one will deny ; but this does not justify the assertion that the rest are all of a merely liturgical character, and have no value independent of this one. And if he had made the good people of Leeds fully understand that the bulky quarto which he was at the pains to carry along and exhibit to them contained only about one part Veda and four parts modern Hindu commentary, of disputed worth, they might not have opened their eyes quite so widely with admiration.

Professor Müller informs us that the present volumes contain only a selection from his fugitive writings on the two classes of subjects indicated. The first includes at least one essay, which we greatly regret that he did not class with those destined to oblivion. We mean that upon the Aitareya Brahmanā of Professor Haug. It is in all respects unworthy of him, being an unreserved and uncritical encomium of a work which, along with great merits, has some striking defects, shows signs of hasty preparation, and unduly depreciates the labors of others in the same field. Nor is its inclusion recommended by any interesting discussion of points of general importance contained in it, or by sound and instructive views upon the period of Hindu antiquity to which it relates, while it is especially objectionable on account of the note which its author has added at the end.

In the article as originally published (Saturday Review for March 19, 1864), Professor Müller had been ill-advised enough to insert an attack upon his fellow Sanskritists, the collaborators in the great Sanskrit lexicon published at St. Petersburg, as having formed a mutual-admiration society with the intent to "sing each other's praises in the literary journals of Russia, Germany, and America," and to "speak slightly" of all outside of that circle. What had happened to call forth this accusation, it is difficult to see ; unless perhaps that more than one of the scholars referred to had recently (without any apparent or known concert) joined in defending the lexicon and its authors from a very violent and unjust attack made upon them. At any rate, Dr. Haug (who has quite enough merit to stand alone, and can afford to invite searching criticism instead of indiscriminate commendation) was patted on the back, and assured that, if his book should be spoken of unkindly "in the journals of the Mutual-Praise Society," this should have no effect upon the opinion of anybody whose opinion was worth having. In the Chips, now, Müller has omitted the offensive paragraph ;

but he has appended to the essay a note which, instead of mitigating, has trebled the original offence. He first explains the omission, intimating the nature of the accusation made, and averring that he did not originate it, but merely repeated it from others, being convinced that there was foundation for it. He represents it as having been met "by a very loud and boisterous denial." He is sorry if he has given unnecessary pain by what he has done, and hopes that in future no reason for similar complaint will be given; if that result is produced, he will try to bear like a martyr the wrath and resentment which he has provoked. We are at a loss for words to characterize the cool effrontery of this paragraph. Its tone of magisterial assumption is not easily to be paralleled. Müller says, in effect, that a parcel of naughty persons have been caught in their naughtiness; that he has administered to them deserved correction, under which they have cried out lustily; that he is grieved at having had to hurt them so much, and make them so angry; but comforts himself with the belief that it is for their good. And this to men some of whom can show services to Sanskrit literature superior to his own, and whose reputation for single-mindedness and candor is, to say the least, not less than his!

As regards, indeed, a reputation for fairness and candor, there are implications and insinuations in this note which are not calculated to be of service to its author. Look, in the first place, at the "very loud and boisterous denial." It is a pity that we are not informed where such a denial is to be met with; we suspect it to, be a figment of Professor Müller's lively imagination. An anonymous criticism in a periodical so little famed for impartiality and leniency of judgment as the *Saturday Review* was not likely greatly to disturb the peace of whomsoever it might be aimed at; and to those who recognized in it the hand of the Oxford Professor it was doubtless more worthy of attention as an illustration of personal character than in any other way. We are not aware that any one ever took public notice of it, excepting Professor Weber of Berlin. This eminent scholar, being himself the butt at which both Haug and Müller had chiefly aimed their arrows, could hardly remain silent without seeming to confess inability to repel the accusations laid against him; accordingly, in his *Indische Studien* (IX. 2, 1865), he reprinted the article, side by side with another very able and trenchant criticism of Dr. Haug's book, written by a Hindu and first printed in India, for the purpose of contrasting the learning and spirit of the two critics,—much to the disadvantage of the Anglo-German; and then, after a few strong but dignified words in answer to the latter's insinuations, he proceeded to a very detailed and careful examination of the work which Müller had volunteered to guarantee especially against any

attack he might make upon it, — discussing it with a fulness of erudition certainly not at the command of any other European scholar, doing justice to its solid merits, but also pointing out, without passion and without carping, its errors and defects; thus furnishing a running commentary upon it of the highest value, and without the assistance of which no unpractised student should venture to use the work at all. This was Weber's "denial": from the way in which Müller describes it one would infer that it must indeed have rung terribly in his ears.

Again, the charges of "literary rattening" which our author says that he merely alludes to, and of which he shifts the burden to Dr. Haug's shoulders, are not to be found in the latter's pages at all; they appear rather to emanate from no other person than the scholar whose attack upon the St. Petersburg lexicon was the occasion of all the after-trouble. So that the plain history of the affair seems to be this: some one falls fiercely upon the work of a company of collaborators; they unite in its defence; thereupon the aggressor reviles them as a mutual-admiration society; and Müller repeats the accusation, giving it his own indorsement, and volunteering in addition that of another scholar.

Once more, Müller refers his readers, if they are curious to see the expunged paragraphs, to the *Indische Studien*, where, he says, the review may be seen "reprinted, though, as usual, very incorrectly." It is strange that, writing especially for Englishmen, he does not send them rather to the place of original publication; apparently, he could not resist the temptation to cast in passing an additional slur upon the man whose denial had seemed to him so boisterous. In this, however, he was too little mindful of the requirements of fair dealing; for he leaves any one who may take the trouble to turn to the *Indische Studien*, and compare the version there given with that found among the Chips, to infer that all the discordances he shall discover are attributable to Weber's "incorrectness"; whereas they are in fact mainly alterations which Müller has made in his own reprint; and the real inaccuracies are perfectly trivial in character and few in number, — such printer's blunders as are rarely avoided by Germans who print English, or by English who print German. We should probably be doing Müller injustice if we maintained that he deliberately meant Weber to bear the odium of all the discrepancies which a comparer might find; but he is equally responsible for the results, if it is owing only to a careless spitefulness on his part.

We regard this note as by far the most discreditable production of Professor Müller that has ever come under our notice; the epithet "outrageous" is hardly too strong to apply to it. If this is to be his

style of carrying on a literary controversy, he cannot much longer claim to be treated with the ordinary courtesies of literary warfare.

It is also not quite fair and above-board that in the body of his article he notes with complacency, as supporting his own view of the matter, that Dr. Haug "calls absurd" the theories of those who hold that the lunar asterisms constituting the old Hindu zodiac were probably devised in some other country than India. For if he had dared to quote Haug's own *dictum*, his readers would have seen how weak a staff it was to lean upon. Haug is speaking of the observation of the solstices recorded in the Jyotisha, and remarks: "To believe that such an observation was imported from some foreign country, Babylon or China, would be absurd; for there is nothing in it to show that it cannot have been made in the northwestern part of India, or a closely adjacent country." That is to say, it is absurd to believe anything the contrary of which does not admit of being proved impossible! Moreover, it will be noticed how far Müller has stretched the bearing of the allegation of absurdity brought by his authority. After these two examples of his ill success in reporting the latter's opinions, we should almost be justified in adding to any further statement of his, "made, as usual, very incorrectly."

In fact, we would call attention to one more very incorrect statement made in the course of the same review. He says, respecting the date of the observation above referred to, that it "has been fixed by the Rev. R. Main at 1186 B. C." (altered in the reprint to "has been accurately fixed," etc.). But this gentleman did nothing whatever toward fixing the date in question except to take a calculation made by Archdeacon Pratt, of Calcutta, and very slightly change the value of one of the factors in it, namely, the precession of the equinoxes. Mr. Pratt had estimated the precession approximately, as is usual in calculations of this character, at one degree in seventy-two years; greater precision than this does not comport with the general conditions of the problem; and the other, by insisting upon its absolute mathematical value, committed a piece of mathematical pedantry, very much as one who should insist on a fraction of a mile in estimating the distance of the sun from us. The whole calculation, to be sure, is little better than worthless, and has been so proved; but if any one is to have credit for it, it is Archdeacon Pratt, and he alone.

Astronomy is not one of Professor Müller's strong points, and it would be easy to show that others of his reasonings in this essay bearing upon astronomical subjects are unsound and without value; but we have surely already said enough to prove our thesis, that the omission of the essay and its appended note from his next edition would be a

notable increase of the value of the work. We hope that in the other pair of volumes, promised as the completion of the series, he will be somewhat more tender of his fellows' reputation and of his own.

2. — 1. *Women's Suffrage; the Reform against Nature.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.
2. *The Subjection of Women.* By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869.

ENGLISH style is distinguished by the atmosphere of homely splendor, of familiar pomp, of surcharged association, in which its words move. The sentences unroll themselves deliberately, seeming to listen to their own progress, now packing volumes of meaning into a simple word, now yielding to passing suggestions and incorporating into their mass epithets and clauses which writers of other nations would neglect as collateral and exuberant fancies. The secret of this peculiarly English richness of movement has been kept by Dr. Bushnell, perhaps, more steadily than by any other of our contemporary writers. Mr. Mill's sentences, clean, weighted, and going straight to their mark, would, if translated literally, sound as natural and forcible to French, German, or Italian ears as they do to ours. But Dr. Bushnell's, in any tongue but our own, would have an outlandish air. To take an example at random: "Where we touch the limits of reason, they [women] touch the limits of excess; where we are impetuous in a cause, they are uncontrollable in it. We know how, as men, to be moderated in part, by self-moderation, even as ships by their helms in all great storms at sea; for the other part we had women kept in moderation by their element, even as ships in harbor lie swinging by their anchors; but now we get even less of help from these than they do from us." The reef on which the old English style often split came from an excess of this self-listening, and the result was affectation, or, to use the vulgar term, *mouthing*. And Dr. Bushnell with his rich fancy has not steered clear of the reef. A clerical training always tends to make a diffuse writer, and we think that "*Women's Suffrage*" would have been a more solid book if its author's remarkable powers of expression had been a little balanced by some cultivation of a correlative power of repression. As it is, he is redundant and careless, not to say often vulgar; as in such phrases as, "the Duchess of Devonshire was a high-life conventional kind of woman."

ERRATUM.

Page 551, line 5, *for* "wind" *read* "mind."